This paper lays the foundation for the theoretical analysis of individual retirement savings by solving a life-cycle model suggested by Yaari (1965) with intertemporal consumption decisions, time-varying income, an uncertain lifetime, and borrowing constraints. A solution is derived both for the general case and for the case with power utility and Gompertz mortality, which leads to closed-form equations. For most people, starting to save in the …rst phase of the career is not optimal. The two main obstacles to earlier and higher retirement savings are high opportunity costs and heavily discounted payo¤s. In view of these, many individuals are better o¤ taking some form of gamble on their longevity risk -the insurance in the form of savings can become simply too expensive.
Introduction
With Social Security's upcoming underfunding issues and employer's reluctance to o¤er de…ned bene…t pension plans, Americans will have to rely increasingly on their personal savings to provide a secure retirement for the future. In that context, there is a growing need to understand the individual component of retirement savings. While Social Security and de…ned bene…t pensions are typically analyzed by complex bene…t formulas based on service and salary, individual savings require a di¤erent approach. They are the result of a series of economic decisions where the individual evaluates the relative costs and bene…ts of foregoing current consumption for future income. Life-cycle models can capture these economic tradeo¤s and lay the foundation for the theoretical analysis of individual retirement savings. The objective of this paper is to …ll a gap in the literature by providing an explicit formulation for the optimal retirement savings strategy in a life-cycle model that includes borrowing constraints.
The starting point for this analysis is a versatile life-cycle model proposed by Yaari (1965) featuring intertemporal consumption decisions, time-varying income, an uncertain lifetime, and borrowing constraints. In a retirement planning context, a ‡exible speci…cation for the income process is necessary to represent realistic changes over the career and at retirement. Longevity risk must also be part of the model because it is a key determinant of savings toward retirement. Borrowing constraints (also called liquidity or non-negative wealth constraints) must be imposed to avoid two types of distortions. First, workers are likely to wish to consume more than they earn at the beginning of their career. Second, when mortality is added to a life-cycle model, borrowing against pensions becomes more attractive because there is a low likelihood that the loan will have to be repaid. Yaari (1965) recognizes that the borrowing constraint can be binding over a number of segments of the solution and, as a result, the optimal consumption process takes two di¤erent forms in the binding and non-binding phases. However, his solution is incomplete because he does not specify how to identify the binding segments: at any given point in time, it is not known which one of the two possible solutions for the optimal consumption process applies. Leung (1994 Leung ( , 2000 Leung ( , 2001 Leung ( , 2007 ) adjusts Yaari's results with partial success since he only focuses on the terminal wealth depletion time. This paper is able to address these limitations by adopting a di¤erent approach that exploits the dual version of the optimization problem.
1 Accordingly, the …rst contribution of this paper is to extend the lifecycle literature by providing a complete solution to Yaari's model for the general case. This solution is expressed in a form that can be directly implemented with a simple application of the bisection method. Whether this solution is based on closed-form equations depends on the model's speci…c inputs. In that regard, a second contribution of this paper is to show that closed-form equations can be obtained for a realistic set of assumptions. The solution to Yaari's model then permits an examination of the optimal retirement savings strategy. The analysis assumes a typical hump-shape income pro…le, where earnings grow at the beginning of the career and ultimately drop at retirement. The solution with this pro…le generally has three segments: 1) there is an initial period where the worker does not save at all for retirement, 2) later, when his income increases su¢ ciently, the individual starts saving at a time and, 3) eventually retirement savings are exhausted by a time T . The third contribution of this paper is to derive the comparative statics for the times and T . These results indicate that the following factors are associated with both an earlier onset and a later exhaustion of savings: low time discounts, longer life expectancy, greater returns on assets, higher incomes, and lower pensions. While it is possible that starting to save right away on the …rst day of work is optimal, a wide range of numerical illustrations is considered in this paper and = 0 only when the rate of return is very high. In other words, younger workers should not be expected to save for retirement unless they are given substantial incentives to do so.
The parsimony of this paper's model also leads to an explicit equation for the saving rate in the interval ( ; T ). With a power utility function, the saving rate is one minus a multiple of the pension-to-income ratio. The result implies that the individual saves up to a point where the marginal bene…t of doing so equals its marginal cost. The formula provides an intuitive interpretation for the marginal bene…t: it is computed as if the dollar saved now was accumulated with interest and consumed at time T , and then discounted for mortality and time preferences. This solution highlights two of the major obstacles standing in the way of greater retirement savings: 1) opportunity costs are high when earnings are low, which is often the case at younger ages and in some socio-economic groups, and 2) the horizon for discounting is time T , a time well past retirement with consequently very high discount rates. These results suggest that …nancial incentives intended to promote retirement savings can meet with a limited response if their appeal is mostly based on future bene…ts and fail to address the fundamental issue of high opportunity costs inhibiting saving.
The model developed in this work has a wide range of potential applications, both on the theoretical side and in terms of numerical evaluations. Three examples of these applications are described in this paper. First, the model can be used as a basis for recommending individual retirement saving strategies. From the perspective of a young worker, this involves planning to start saving at a future time and then maintaining the level of consumption that prevails at time throughout the rest of the career. For a hump-shaped income pro…le, the resulting saving rate emerges gradually and increases with income. Second, a discussion of policies to promote retirement savings suggests that more attention should be paid to the opportunity cost aspect of the problem. Third, an example of the model's ability to quantify concrete problems is given by considering the case of automatic enrollment strategies in de…ned contribution plans. The welfare impact of these strategies is assessed and the results indicate that they should be considered carefully because they can result in losses for those without serious procrastination issues.
In addition to Yaari (1965) and Leung (2007) , the results can be related to several strands of literature. For instance, from a theoretical point of view it can be shown that the solution in the interval ( ; T ) is identical to that obtained from a life-cycle model with an horizon of T and no borrowing constraint. By showing that optimal savings gradually increase with income, the model also provides a theoretical justi…cation for the Save More Tomorrow strategy proposed by Thaler and Benartzi (2004) . From an empirical perspective, the model can o¤er an explanation for low take-up rates in matching programs requiring individual contributions (e.g. see Mitchell, Utkus, Yang (2007) and Du ‡o, Orszag, Gale, Saez, Liebman (2007) ). Furthermore, this paper's conclusion that retirement savings may arise only later in one's career is in line with empirical …ndings from the precautionary savings literature. Notably, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) decompose total savings into a precautionary component and a life-cycle component and estimate that retirement savings start around age 38.
2 With a set of baseline assumptions, the results obtained in this paper are in the same neighborhood with retirement savings starting a little past age 36. However, this paper di¤ers from the previous literature by examining the sensitivity of this result and showing that signi…cant variations exist. The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the general solution to Yaari's model. Section 3 provides a closed-form solution for the special case with power utility and Gompertz mortality. Section 4 analyzes the optimal retirement savings strategy in the context of typical hump-shaped income pro…les. Section 5 discusses three applications of the model. Section 6 concludes by suggesting directions for future research.
General Case
This paper considers an optimization problem that essentially corresponds to the one proposed in Yaari (1965) for the case without bequest motives and actuarial notes. This approach is chosen to provide a clean picture of the retirement savings mechanism and it can serve as a stepping stone for the study of more complex models in future works. Although this model could eventually be enriched with various sources of risks, a simple structure facilitates the analysis of optimal retirement saving behavior. For instance, including income risk in the model would make it di¢ cult to detangle precautionary savings from retirement savings when examining wealth.
Model and assumptions
The optimization problem consists of …nding the stream of consumption that maximizes lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint and a borrowing constraint, i.e.:
subject to
and
where:
f (t) is a discount function that can be used to represent time preferences, mortality, or any other time-varying component of utility; ! 1 is the last possible age in the problem; r > 0 is the after-tax real risk-free rate of return;
W t is the wealth process and w 0 0 is the initial wealth; y t > 0 is a deterministic, …nite, after-tax, real income stream (including pensions or annuities) that the individual expects to receive in the future.
The optimal consumption and wealth processes are denoted respectively by c t and W t ; the corresponding value function is given by
Retirement problems are a special case of the model above where the income process and the utility function may change upon retirement. These retirementspeci…c issues are discussed in Section 4. For now, the life-cycle model is kept general with only a mild technical restriction: the inputs u 0 (y t ), f (t), and r are assumed to be such that lim t!! (t) = 0 and (t) is continuous, where (t) is a function de…ned by
The …rst assumption should generally be satis…ed when mortality is taken into account as f (t) eventually converges rapidly to zero. The continuity assumption is made to streamline the derivation of the results, the extension to the case with discontinuities is discussed at the end of this section.
Lagrangian and necessary conditions
The …rst step in solving an optimization problem such as the one in (1)- (3) is to formulate its Lagrangian as
where 0 and (t) 0 denote respectively the Lagrange multipliers for the budget constraint and the borrowing constraint. Following He and Pages (1993) , the problem can be simpli…ed by introducing the process X(t) = + R ! t (s)ds and rewriting the Lagrangian more compactly as
Accordingly, for c t to be an optimal control, there must exist a process X(t) such that the following …ve Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are satis…ed:
c t = y t whenever W t = 0; (10)
where
Solution
There exists a function X(t) which satis…es the …ve necessary conditions given above and thus solves the optimization problem. The appendix presents a formal version of this solution along with a proof. With technical details set aside, the solution can be exposed more intuitively in this section. As noted by Yaari (1965) , the solution is composed of two types of segments: 1) those where the borrowing constraint is binding (W t = 0 and c t = y t ), and 2) those where the borrowing constraint is not binding (W t > 0 and c t > 0). 3 Yaari characterizes the optimal consumption growth when there is an interior solution, but does not delimitate the periods where the borrowing constraint is binding. Thus, at any given time t, his solution does not specify which of the two possible cases for c t applies. To complete Yaari's solution, let T 1 ; T 2 ; :::; T M denote the times where the solution alternates between the binding and non-binding periods. The relationship between these times and the periods with W t > 0 or W t = 0 is illustrated below.
Case 2
At inception, the solution may start either in a non-binding period (Case 1) or in a binding period (Case 2). Afterwards, the solution can alternate a number of times between the two types of periods. Eventually, the assumption that (t) converges to zero implies that there exists a time T M after which the borrowing constraint is binding forever. A priori, M can be any number if there are no restrictions on the model's parameters. With the times T 1 ; T 2 ; :::; T M de…ned, it is then possible to formulate the solution for X(t). In order to satisfy necessary conditions (9), (10), (11), and (13), this process must take the form:
3 While Yaari also mentions the case where c s = 0, this case is ruled out by the assumption that lim c!0
In turn, the two possible solutions for c t are obtained by substituting X(t) in (9). Accordingly, the solution at time t in any non-binding period (T m ; T m+1 ) is given by
By contrast, the solution when time t is in any binding period [T m ; T m+1 ] takes the simpler form
2.4. Solving for T 1 ; T 2 ; :::; T M To complete the solution, it remains to address the more challenging issue of determining the times T 1 ; T 2 ; :::; T M . For that purpose, the budget constraint o¤ers a starting point by requiring that these times satisfy the equations
for all non-binding phases (T m ; T m+1 ) with m > 0. By themselves, these equations do not provide su¢ cient information to completely determine the times T 1 ; T 2 ; :::; T M because: 1) the solution to these equations is not necessarily unique, 2) there is only one equation to identify two unknowns T m and T m+1 , 3) they do not imply that the borrowing constraint is necessarily satis…ed everywhere or that utility is maximized, 4) if w 0 = 0 at time 0, either Case 1 or Case 2 may apply, and 5) the number of equations W (T m ; T m+1 ) = 0 to solve is not known. Fortunately, each of these issues can be addressed with a few deductions. To begin, the necessary condition X 0 (t) 0 combined with the solution for X(t) in (15) implies that the times T 1 ; T 2 ; :::; T M must occur in periods where the function (t) is decreasing. This simple observation allows us to structure and determine most of the solution because the solutions to W (0; T 1 ) = w 0 and W (T m ; T m+1 ) = 0 are unique in intervals where (t) is decreasing. To exploit this, the notation
; N is introduced to represent the periods where (t) is strictly decreasing (with t l i and t u i being respectively the lower and upper bounds of period i). For realistic cases and relatively smooth income pro…les, a quick inspection of the formula for (t) reveals that the number N of these decreasing periods should generally be small.
The problem can then be viewed as a sequential process where in Case 1 the …rst step is to solve for T 1 in W (0; T 1 ) = w 0 .
4 This solution T 1 must be part of one of the intervals D i with i 2 [1; N ]. These potential solutions can be distinguished by introducing the notation t i 2 D i such that W (0; t i ) = w 0 . Conveniently, the properties of (t) and W (0; t) guarantee that there can be at most one t i within each period D i . At this juncture however, there might be more than one period i where a solution t i exists. When multiple solutions are possible, the necessary condition W t 0 provides a tie binder: the optimal t i must be such that the borrowing constraint is satis…ed for all t. This problem is di¢ cult to resolve with conventional methods because they do not suggest a solution or o¤er a simple way to demonstrate that the borrowing constraint is satis…ed everywhere. Both issues can be addressed by employing dual methods which restate the optimization problem in terms of an equivalent unconstrained minimization problem where X(t) is the control variable. This dual problem is detailed in the appendix and it indicates that the optimal t i is the one with the highest corresponding value for (t i ).
The next step is to solve for the pair of times T 2 and T 3 that satis…es W (T 2 ; T 3 ) = 0. More generally, by identifying k such that T m 1 2 D k , the same procedure can be used to determine the boundaries (T m ; T m+1 ) of any of the non-binding periods with m > 0, including those in Case 2. Again, the equation W (T m ; T m+1 ) = 0 has potentially multiple solutions and the intervals D i assist in narrowing them down. In particular, it can be shown that 1)
In combination, these results imply that for each pe-
) and accordingly, this permits the introduction of an inverse function T i (t) such that
When de…ned, this inverse function makes it possible to rewrite equation (23) as a single-variable problem:
Within each period D i with i > k, the properties of W (t; T ) guarantee that there can be at most one solution to (25). The notation t i such that W (t i ; T i (t i )) = 0 5 T m must be within the same decreasing interval D k as T m 1 since necessary condition (11) prevents (t) from increasing over the binding period (T m 1 ; T m ). However, T m and T m+1 cannot be in the same decreasing period as this would imply that the individual always save in (T m ; T m+1 ) and it would make it impossible to get W (T m ; T m+1 ) = 0; thus, T m+1 2 D i>k . It must also be the case that (T m ) = (T m+1 ) because otherwise necessary conditions (11) or (13) would be violated. is used to distinguish the possible solutions. Again, if more than one solution t i exists, dual methods show that the one with the highest (t i ) is optimal. This procedure to determine the pair of times (T m ; T m+1 ) can be repeated iteratively until k = N . In that case, the problem stops because it is not possible to de…ne a time T m+1 2 D i with i > N . When this occurs, T M = T m 1 and the value of M is resolved.
To summarize, the solution for T 1 ; :::; T M outlined in this section can be described as an iterative process with a few possible variations. To implement this solution directly, it is more convenient to express it in algorithmic form. This alternate format is presented in the appendix with a simple four-step process. This process also de…nes clearly how to solve for t i in equations W (0; t i ) = w 0 and W (t i ; T i (t i )) = 0. Given the uniqueness of the solution within each period D i , the times t i can be easily inverted numerically with the bisection method by specifying the proper boundaries.
Discontinuities in (t)
The results presented in this section can be extended to the case with discontinuities in (t): in the limit, these jumps can be replicated by a very rapid change in (t). The solution is mostly una¤ected when the break in (t) occurs when the function is increasing. In that case, functions evaluated at discontinuous points are simply replaced with their left-side limit. If the jump occurs at a timet where the function (t) is decreasing, the methodology used to solve for the times t i has to be slightly modi…ed. Speci…cally, three possible scenarios have to be considered: the solution can be before, at, or after timet. Standard techniques such as the intermediate value theorem can be used to identify which case applies. When the solution is at timet in Case 1, a constant is substituted to (T m+1 ) and the problem becomes: solve for in W (0;t) = w 0 . In Case 2, the problem changes to W (t; t i ) = 0 ift 2 D k and to W (t i ;t) = 0 with (T m+1 ) replaced by (T m ) if t 2 D i>k .
Explicit solution for the case with power utility and Gompertz mortality
The application of the solution described in the previous section is facilitated when there is a closed-form equation for W (t; T ). Of course, the challenge when trying to obtain this type of solution is to avoid sacri…cing realism. This section shows that it is possible to achieve this objective with a set of assumptions which is ‡exible enough to re ‡ect many credible scenarios.
Assumptions
Following the approach commonly taken in the life-cycle literature, the utility function is assumed to be given by a power utility function, i.e.
where > 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. This utility is multiplied by the usual exponential time-discount function e t with > 0. The time of death is uncertain and represented by a Gompertz distribution. This is a two-parameter mortality distribution, which is frequently used because it has the double advantage of …tting actual mortality rates fairly well and leading to closed-form solutions for many problems. This distribution posits that the propensity to die increases exponentially with age and its force of mortality is given by t = e (t m)=b =b. Lifetime uncertainty is incorporated in the model by using the standard equivalent approach of multiplying the utility at time t by the probability p 0;t of surviving from time 0 to time t. In other words, f (t) = e t p 0;t in the objective function in equation (1). For the Gompertz distribution, the probability of surviving from time t to time T is given by
In order to get a ‡exible speci…cation for the income process, the interval [0; !] is …rst divided into J subintervals [t j ; t j+1 ) with j = 1; :::; J. A function J(t) is introduced to identify the period j corresponding to a time t. The level of income at the beginning of each interval is denoted by y t j . At any of these times, the income process is allowed to jump downwards, which permits a representation of the typical drop in income at retirement. Over a period [t j ; t j+1 ), the income process is assumed to grow exponentially at a rate g j and is given by
Since the rate of income growth can be varied over the J periods and these periods can be made arbitrarily small, this model can be used to replicate most income patterns.
Solution
By substituting the assumptions given above in Section 2's equations, the following closed-form expressions are obtained for the wealth process W (t; T ) and the components B(t; T ) and C(t; T ) of the value function:
A few observations about these formulas can be made. In the budget constraint W (t; T ), Y t;T can be interpreted as the present value of human capital in the interval ( ; T ) and the product (T ) 1= A t;T represents the present value of the optimal consumption stream. The solution is thus equivalent to the one that would be obtained for a model with an horizon of T and no borrowing constraint. The expression (a; x) is the incomplete Gamma function and it commonly arises in closed-form solutions when mortality follows a Gompertz distribution. It can usually be computed with built-in functions in computer software. 6 For example, Milevsky (2006) shows how to evaluate this function with Excel's functions GAMMADIST and GAMMALN. The solution is then completed by determining the times T 1 ; :::; T M with the formulas listed above and the four-step algorithm presented in the appendix.
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Several cases for the speci…cation of these times are possible, the shape of the function (t) determines which one applies. The solution in the appendix encompasses all possible scenarios and the special case M = 2 is described in the next section. Within any of the resulting non-binding phases (T m ; T m+1 ), the optimal consumption and wealth processes are given by 6 If the incomplete Gamma function cannot be computed with built-in functions, two alternatives are: 1) evaluating the function numerically with a series development (e.g., see Press, Teukolsky, Vetterling, Flannery (2007) ), or 2) using a discrete mortality 
4. Optimal retirement savings strategy: Hump-shaped income pro…le
With the solution to Yaari's model established, it is now possible to address the question that is the object of this paper: What is the optimal retirement saving strategy in a life-cycle model with borrowing constraints? To introduce the retirement element in the general model, it is assumed that the individual has a hump-shaped income pro…le: earnings increase at the beginning of his career, they grow more slowly or decline at older ages, and eventually they drop at retirement. This pattern generally appears in aggregate data and permits the interpretation of all savings in the solution as retirement savings. Since most individuals do not have retirement savings when they start working, w 0 = 0. When borrowing constraints are added to a life-cycle model, formulating the optimal saving strategy is a two-step process. First, the periods where the borrowing constraint is binding must be determined. Second, the saving strategy within the non-binding periods must be speci…ed. With a hump-shaped income pro…le, the global structure of the solution is fairly simple to describe. 8 There is a time where the individual starts to save. A corner solution = 0 is possible, i.e. it can be optimal to start saving at the beginning of the career. After time , the individual initially builds up his savings and then draws them down after retirement until they are exhausted by a time T . In the two binding periods [0; ] and [T; !], the individual consumes his entire income. In the non-binding period ( ; T ), the individual saves a fraction s t = (y t c t )=y t of his income for retirement. With that framework, a retirement saving strategy can be characterized by three key components: , T , and s t in-between. The next subsections analyze each of these elements from a theoretical perspective and the section concludes with numerical illustrations.
Optimal onset
The concept of an optimal time to start saving for retirement has not been discussed previously in the life-cycle literature, perhaps because it is commonly assumed that the individual has positive savings at the onset of the problem (i.e. w 0 > 0). When all savings in the model are interpreted as retirement savings, it is more realistic to presume that w 0 = 0 at the beginning of the career and that savings will arise later at a time . As can be shown by applying the results from Section 2, this time is jointly determined with T and the pair is obtained by solving the following system of two equations with two unknowns
The …rst condition W ( ; T ) = 0 is quite intuitive, it is simply the budget constraint. The second condition ( ) = (T ) can be interpreted as "the individual initiates a savings phase when the marginal bene…t (M B) of saving starts exceeding its marginal cost (M C)". To illustrate this equivalence, the equation for (t) is substituted in ( ) = (T ) and the condition can be rewritten as:
Equation (40) shows the link between an individual's pre-retirement saving problem and his post-retirement situation. Since the individual is consuming y at time , the marginal cost of saving a dollar at that time can be computed directly with u 0 (y ). On the other side of the equation, the marginal bene…t is evaluated as if the dollar saved at time was spend at time T . By construction, the individual consumes his income y T at that time and the marginal utility of spending one dollar is u 0 (y T ). This utility is multiplied by a factor e r(T ) to re ‡ect the fact that a dollar saved at time accumulates with interest until time T . It is then discounted by e (T ) and p ;T to take into account time preferences and survival probabilities.
The result in equation (40) reveals why some individuals are reluctant to start saving for retirement: they either face high opportunity costs for saving or they discount future bene…ts too heavily. For instance, low incomes are an obstacle to saving because they imply high opportunity costs. Myopic individuals and those with high mortality prospects postpone saving because they severely discount the future associated bene…ts. Favorable market conditions and preferential tax treatment should increase returns and make it relatively more attractive to start saving early. Poor economic conditions would have the opposite e¤ect, especially if they are combined with a lowering of incomes. Equation (40) also shows that those with high pensions (i.e. y T ) have limited incentives to start saving while those with little in the way of pensions should be more eager to start building their nest egg. Unfortunately, those who have both low incomes and low pensions are caught between a rock and a hard place: while saving now has a high opportunity cost, failing to do so can have dire consequences in the future. For them, the best hope might come in the form of external subsidies.
These intuitive results can be formalized by deriving comparative statics for , which is one advantage of having a tractable solution. The derivatives are obtained by applying standard techniques to the equations in (39).
9 Based on these formulas, it can be shown that the comparative statics have the following signs:
The results in (41) con…rm the earlier predictions that workers start saving earlier for retirement if they are not myopic, they live longer, they enjoy greater returns on their investments, and they have higher incomes or lower pensions.
Optimal exhaustion T
In this model, a time T where savings are permanently depleted can always be found. Beyond some point, the odds of being alive become so slim that it is not worth saving for that contingency if one receives any form of pension. Similarly to , the sign of several comparative statics can be established for T :
Retirees will exhaust their savings later if they are not myopic, they expect to live longer, they have higher returns on their investments, they had higher incomes during their careers or they have lower pensions after retirement. Note that all the comparative statics here have opposite signs when compared to those obtained for . This is in part because, ceteris paribus, those who start saving earlier accumulate greater retirement savings and are able to spread these funds over a longer period of time after retirement. The results in (42) also re ‡ect the fact that the speed at which individuals spend down their retirement savings depends on their preferences and situation. Those who are more myopic or have lower life expectancy will exhaust their savings more quickly. Those with higher pension income can also a¤ord to run down their assets more rapidly because they will be in a relatively better situation when they have to live o¤ their pension income and the result d =d t for the force of mortality applies to t 2 ( ; T ). For d =dr < 0, the result generally holds unless is very high. For dT =dr > 0, the result can be demonstrated for N = 2.
after time T . By contrast, a higher rate of return would make retirement savings last longer and increase T for everyone.
Optimal level of savings
The last component of the retirement saving strategy is the saving rate s t between times and T , which can be expressed explicitly as a percentage of income with the following equation:
Equation (43) shows a new result: the saving rate s t is linear in the pensionto-income ratio y T =y t . Thus, the saving rate should increase and decrease with income over the individual's working years. According to equation (43), mortality plays an important role in terms of moderating the propensity to save. Since T typically occurs many years after retirement, p t;T tends to be much smaller than one. To illustrate this e¤ect, consider the case where r = (which implies s t = 1 y T =y t p 1= t;T ) and assume that y T =y t = 60%, p t;T = 30%, and = 3. In that case, incorporating mortality lowers the saving rate signi…cantly from (1 60%) = 40% to (1 60% 30% 1=3 ) = 10%. This is just an example highlighting that it is critical to take mortality into consideration when analyzing retirement saving behavior. When doing so, it must also be recognized that the horizon that matters for decision-making is T rather than retirement. This horizon also applies to two other factors in equation (43), the rate of return and the time preference discount. If r = , these two e¤ects cancel out. If r > , the return e¤ect dominates and savings increase. Otherwise, impatience trumps returns and savings decrease. Over long periods of time, the e¤ect of a gap in r is compounded and it can become signi…cantly leveraged. This should be kept in mind when setting assumptions for r and in life-cycle models applications.
Finally, it can be observed that the factors hampering greater savings at time t are essentially the same as those that delayed the onset of retirement savings in Section 4.1. This similarity can be seen by rewriting the solution for c t in (37) as:
In other words, at time t, the individual increases his savings as long as the associated marginal bene…t exceeds the marginal cost, i.e. until a point where consumption reaches a level c t where M C = M B. Again, additional savings at time t are inhibited either by high opportunity costs or high discounts applied to future bene…ts.
Numerical illustrations
The concepts discussed above can be illustrated more concretely with a numerical example based on the formulas developed in Section 3.2. Figure 1 depicts the results for a set of baseline assumptions and Figure 2 presents a wide range of sensitivity tests. For the baseline scenario, the problem starts at age 25 with initial wealth w 0 = 0. The real after-tax rate of return is set to r = 3%, the time-discount factor to = 3%, and the coe¢ cient of risk aversion to = 3. The survival probabilities are modeled according to a Gompertz distribution with parameters m = 57 and b = 13. These parameters are chosen to …t unisex mortality data from the National Center for Health Statistics and correspond to a life expectancy of 75 years. individual is assumed to retire at age 62, which is the most common retirement age in the United States. Pensions after retirement are assumed to be …xed and represent 60% of pre-retirement income, which is in line with the average income replacement rate observed at age 62 in the Health and Retirement Study.
The solution to the optimization problem for the baseline scenario appears in Figure 1 : Panel A plots the optimal consumption process along with the income assumption and Panel B displays the optimal savings. The solution in Figure 1 is composed of three phases. First, the borrowing constraint is initially binding because income is relatively low and the individual does not start saving for retirement until age 36.4. The second phase in the solution is an accumulation/decumulation period starting at age 36.4 and ending at age 86.3. At the beginning of this phase, the saving rate increases gradually as income grows and it eventually attains a rate close to 12%. At retirement, accumulated savings reach $112,000. After retirement, a spend-down phase is initiated until savings are exhausted by age 86.3. In the third and …nal phase of the solution after age 86.3, the borrowing constraint is binding and the individual consumes his pension income for the rest of his life. It should be noted that not everybody lives long enough to see this last phase where retirement savings are exhausted. In Figure  1 , the probability of reaching age 86.3 is only 25%.
To examine the sensitivity of these results, Figure 2 graphs the optimal ages and T as a function of the following factors: , life expectancy, , r , y 0 , and the income replacement rate at retirement. Figure 2 con…rms that changing these parameters has the e¤ect predicted by the comparative statics in (41) and (42).
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The …gure also illustrates the wide possible range of values that and T can take. The ages range from 25 to 62 years old for and from 62 to over 100 years old for T . For , the ages are generally less than 45 years old unless the individual is extremely myopic, he expects to die very early, or he is not risk averse at all. In most cases, it is not optimal to start to save for retirement right away at age 25.
Since the only exception occurs when the rate of return exceeds 9%, this suggests that it takes strong arti…cial incentives to induce optimal savings at the beginning of one's career.
Applications
The model developed in this paper can be applied to a wide range of practical issues related to retirement savings. It is particularly well suited to the analysis of problems involving Social Security design, employer-sponsored retirement programs, individual retirement saving strategies, tax incentives, and annuities. This section demonstrates the model's potential with three examples of applications. First, two prescriptions for individual retirement savings strategies are suggested. Second, policies to promote retirement savings are examined. Third, the model is used to assess the welfare implications of automatic enrollment strategies in de…ned contribution plans.
Optimal individual strategies
Everyone who expects a material decline in income at older ages should start saving for retirement at some point. While the actual timing and level of savings varies across individuals, there are two broad conclusions that emerge from the results. First, despite the common perception that people who are not saving for retirement ought to do so, this is not always an optimal strategy. Although factors such as compounded interest, employer matching contributions, and preferential tax treatment tip the balance in favor of an earlier onset of retirement savings, they are not su¢ cient to justify the optimality of an immediate saving strategy for everybody. As mentioned earlier, the e¤ect of high opportunity costs and discounts can o¤set these bene…ts. The illustrations in Figure 2 show that it is rarely optimal to start saving for retirement at the beginning of the career. For many people, waiting until one's thirties or forties is best. Of course, these results do not imply that people should not save early for precautionary motives -this is a separate problem that is not modeled here.
Second, the result in equation (43) indicates that formulating a retirement saving strategy in terms of a …xed percentage of income over the work life is not optimal. While this approach is common in …nancial planning, the inception of savings should be more gradual and re ‡ect income increases. Rather than being expressed as a …xed percentage of income, the retirement saving strategy should be articulated in terms of locking in the level of consumption that prevails at the onset of savings. Afterwards, any income above this baseline level of consumption should be saved for retirement. 13 This idea of a gradual onset of saving can be related to the Save More Tomorrow (SMT) strategy proposed by Thaler and Benartzi (2004) . With this approach, workers commit now to gradually increase their 401(k) saving rate by allocating future salary increases to the plan. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) demonstrate the e¤ectiveness of this tactic in terms of increasing savings. Interestingly, although the SMT approach was introduced as a prescriptive strategy to address behavioral issues, this paper's model shows that it can also be justi…ed with a theoretical life-cycle model.
Policies to promote retirement savings
Another application of our results is to identify incentives for greater retirement savings. In that regard, the comparative statics in (41) and (42) show that retirement savings would increase (through a decrease in or an increase in T ) if myopia decreases, life expectancy increases, the rate of return increases, income increases, or pensions decrease. However, policy and industry makers have to be aware of some of the limitations inherent to these strategies. For instance, it might be di¢ cult to manipulate directly some of these parameters. The best candidates for intervention are probably the level of pensions and the rate of return, but these options have to be examined cautiously since they generally come at 13 If r = , the consumption level is almost ‡at during the working years and it is initially tied to pensions by y T p 1= ;T ; this level then slightly declines over the career by a mortality factor p 1= t; . Large di¤erences in r and could produce di¤erent patterns. a cost. The other variables are harder to in ‡uence directly because they are not linked to typical design features of retirement-related programs. In some cases though, indirect in ‡uences may be employed, such as using education to correct misperceptions about life expectancy.
With distant bene…ts being heavily discounted, the analysis in Section 4 suggests that it might be more fruitful to focus on the opportunity cost aspect of the retirement saving decision. A recent study by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) (2008) reports that 83% of those who think they save insu¢ ciently for retirement attribute it to not having enough money left over after paying bills. While this is beyond the scope of this paper, there is a wide array of questions related to opportunity costs that merit further investigation. For instance, given higher opportunity costs for lower income employees, is it fair to require matching contributions in de…ned contribution plans? Do employees really value a dollar in retirement savings from the employer, in other words, would they prefer a dollar in income? Do current policies designed to promote retirement savings generate new savings or are they mostly subsidizing existing savers? By contrast with simple retirement savings accumulation techniques, the model proposed in this paper is well suited to answer such questions because it can: 1) recognize the opportunity cost associated with saving, 2) take into account the intricate relationship between optimal individual saving behavior, income, and pensions, and 3) measure and contrast welfare in di¤erent scenarios.
Finally, it appears just as important for policy and industry makers to realize that some factors driving individual retirement savings are outside their control. The current turmoil in the …nancial markets makes this apparent as many Americans have seen the value of their retirement accounts drop by up to 40% in 2008. As evidenced by AARP's (2008) report that one out of …ve workers aged 45 and older has stopped contributing to their retirement accounts in 2008, this situation is adversely impacting saving behavior. This suggests that eventual gains from policies intended to promote retirement savings can easily by swamped away by market downturns. Although the current scenario is extreme, it highlights the vulnerability of a strategy of relying on individual savings to ensure retirement income security. As can be shown with this paper's model, workers are willing to increase their savings only so much to counteract a loss. This can be particularly problematic when losses or additional expenses arise from many sources, e.g. if an increase in savings is used to o¤set investment losses, this crowds out the potential to use this strategy to address reductions in Social Security bene…ts.
Delayed onset and automatic enrollment
The model can also be used to evaluate the impact of strategies attempting to correct sub-optimal saving behavior. For example, a lot of attention has been given recently to the automatic enrollment feature in 401(k) plans where employees have to actively opt out of the plan. Research shows that this approach can dramatically increase initial participation rates, but it also points out that inertia can result in participants sticking with inadequate default saving and investment strategies.
14 While current research has mostly focused on observable outcomes, this paper's model can provide a di¤erent type of insight by quantifying the welfare impact of automatic enrollment. This can be illustrated by using the baseline scenario of Section 4.4 as a starting point. The following case of sub-optimal behavior is considered: without automatic enrollment, the individual delays the onset of his savings by d years (after his optimal date ) and adopts his optimal saving strategy afterwards. If automatic enrollment is implemented, it is assumed that the individual does not opt out and selects the default contribution rate. The utility associated with this scenario can be evaluated by building on formulas (18), (21), (30), and (31). The impact of automatic enrollment on welfare can then be assessed by …nding the amount of additional wealth that makes this utility equal to the one in the optimal scenario. 15 14 More information on automatic enrollment can be found in the original work by Madrian and Shea (2001) ; for a recent update see Nessmith, Utkus, and Young (2007) . 15 With borrowing constraints, the value function is not de…ned for negative wealth. Thus, standard approaches cannot be used to determine a wealth-equivalent for a welfare loss. This issue is addressed by considering that the additional wealth takes the form of a fraction of the The results are presented in Figure 3 for the cases d = 0; 5; 10; 20 and for default contribution rates ranging from 0% to 10% of income. In each panel, two scenarios are illustrated: automatic savings starting at time 0 (age 25) and at time (age 36.4 for the baseline case). In the …rst scenario, the automatic strategy generally worsens welfare for those who behave optimally (d = 0) and those who can be quali…ed as mild (d = 5) or moderate (d = 10) procrastinators. This is because the gain generated by inducing saving between times and + d is more than o¤set by the loss resulting from saving in a period where it is not optimal to do so (between 0 and ). In other words, for them "two wrongs don't make a right" -hopefully, they would realize that and choose to opt out and join later. The loss is modest for very small contribution rates, but it can be material (around $15,000) for the highest contribution rate of 10%. Note that these welfare losses could be reduced if automatic savings started later. This is illustrated in Figure  3 by considering the ideal case where automatic savings start at time instead of time 0. In that scenario, as long as the contribution rate is not too high, welfare losses tend to be reduced by a small amount instead of being increased.
For those who are more serious procrastinators (d = 20), automatic enrollment is generally bene…cial -that is, as long as the contribution rate is not too high and they do not opt out. Since the magnitude of this gain is at most a few thousand dollars, plan sponsors should weigh this against the possibly larger losses for the other cases. Figure 3 also suggests that a practical application for this paper's model is to help plan sponsors determine optimal default contribution rates. For example, for the case where d = 20 and savings start at age 25, welfare peaks when the contribution rate is around 3%.
Conclusion
With a declining outlook for pensions, a larger share of retirement income will have to be derived from individual savings. In that context, the objective of future stream of income, instead of being a lump-sum at time 0. this paper is to uncover the economic dynamics underlying the formation and exhaustion of individual retirement savings. This mechanism is often obscured in numerical solutions to increasingly complex life-cycle models. This paper develops a life-cycle model which captures enough realistic features to produce credible numerical illustrations, yet is su¢ ciently parsimonious to generate explicit solutions. Speci…cally, the theoretical contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it revisits Yaari's (1965) model and solves it for the general case. Second, it shows how to obtain closed-form equations for that solution with a set of realistic assumptions. Third, it derives several comparative statics for and T , the times of onset and exhaustion of retirement savings.
Analyzing the resulting solution reveals that the optimal retirement savings strategy can be divided into three stages over the life-cycle: a period [0; ] without any savings, a period [ ; T ] where savings are accumulated and then depleted, and lastly, a period [T; !] where savings are permanently exhausted. The same trade-o¤ motivates the individual to either start saving or to save more: the marginal bene…t of a dollar saved must be greater than its opportunity cost. This relationship highlights two of the main factors hindering retirement savings: 1) those with relatively lower incomes have higher opportunity costs and are likely to be better o¤ paying their bills than saving for retirement, and 2) the bene…ts of saving may not loom large in the decision process because they are e¤ectively discounted as if they were consumed at time T , which ranges from about 62 to 100 years old in our illustrations. E¤orts to promote savings may be wasted if they fail to recognize these hurdles. These major obstacles also suggest that, for some, low observed retirement savings can be in line with optimal behavior rather than being a sign of deviation from normative behavior. When evaluating whether people save enough for retirement, it should be kept in mind that there is a di¤erence between making ex-ante optimal saving decisions and having ex-post adequate retirement savings. This paper presents multiple opportunities for future research. For instance, the simple structure of the solution lends itself well to empirical tests. From a theoretical perspective, the model could be extended to include additional sources of risk. Finally, the model could be applied to quantify the impact on savings and welfare of various retirement-related programs. Given that many of the programs currently in place originate from historical developments and trends, it would be interesting to assess more formally whether they are truly e¢ cient in terms of meeting sponsor's objectives and enhancing individual welfare.
Appendix: Solution and Proof to Section 2.1's Problem Proposition 1. Let (t) and W (t; T ) be the continuous functions de…ned respectively in equations (5) and (17). Assume that lim t!! (t) = 0 and w 0 0. For any two periods i and k, de…ne T i (t) as an inverse function such that t 2 D k , T i (t) 2 D i , and (t) = (T i (t)). The solution to the optimization problem in (1)-(3) takes two possible forms, depending on the borrowing constraint being binding or not. The times T 1 ; :::; T M separate the binding and non-binding periods and are constructed with the following four-step process:
Step 1. Identify the periods D i where (t) is strictly decreasing. Step 2. Determine whether the borrowing constraint is binding at t=0.
In the …rst period [0; T 1 ], the borrowing constraint is non-binding in Case 1 and binding in Case 2. Case 1 applies if w 0 > 0 or if w 0 = 0 and there exists a period i 1 (i > 1 if t l 1 = 0) with a solution t i 2 D i to W (0; t i ) = 0 with (t i ) (0). Proceed to Step 3 in Case 1 and to Step 4 in Case 2.
Step 3. Solve for T 1 in W (0; T 1 ) = w 0 . As demonstrated in He and Pages (1993) , the optimization problem in (1)-(3) is equivalent to …nding the process X 2 D which minimizes J J(X(t); t), where D represents the set of non-negative and decreasing processes. The connection between the minimization of J and the borrowing constraint can be established by observing that J x (X (t); t) = e rt W t . If J is minimized, the borrowing constraint is satis…ed because it must be the case that J x (X (t); t) 0 along the optimal path (otherwise, J could be decreased by picking a lower X(t)). To show that our solution indeed minimizes J, …rst observe that the optimal process X(t) must take the form given in equation (15) to satisfy conditions (9), (10), (11), and (13). The argument can then be completed by showing that J would increase if, among the possible solutions that satisfy the budget constraint (i.e. the times t i such that W (0; t i ) = w 0 and W (t i ; T i (t i )) = 0), a t i other than the one with the highest value of (t i ) was chosen. For Case 1, J decreases with X(0) = (t i ) because J x (X(0); 0) = w 0 0; setting T 1 = t i with (t i ) < (t i ) would thus increase J. For Case 2 with T m 1 2 D k , J decreases with X(t) = (t i ) for all t 2 (t i ; t u k ) because over that range J x (X(t); t) = R T i (t i ) t e rs (c s y s )ds = R t t i e rs (c s y s )ds < 0. 17 Choosing any of the other admissible t i 2 D k with (t i ) < (t i ) for T m would imply that X(t) decreases for all t 2 (t i ; t i ) (t i ; t u k ) and that consequently J increases.
Finally, Proposition 1's proof can be completed by demonstrating the existence and uniqueness of the times t i . Within each period D i , this stems from the continuity of the functions W (0; t) and W (t; T i (t)) and by noting that in Case 1 dW (0; t)=dt > 0 for all t 2 (t l i ; t u i ) and that in Case 2 dW (t; T i (t))=dt > 0 for all t 2 (t i ; t u i ) if W (t i ; T i (t i )) = 0. The result follows by applying the intermediate value theorem in conjunction with the boundaries de…ned in Proposition 1. Similar arguments can be used to prove the global existence of at least one time t i in each problem. In that case, it must also be consider that in Case 1 W (0; 0) = 0 and 17 The equality in J x follows from the budget constraint. The second expression can be signed by noting that c s < y s for all s 2 (t i ; t u k ) because (t) is decreasing over that interval and c s can be rewritten as u 0 1 (u 0 (y s ) (t i )= (s)) < y s . 18 18 The assumption that (t) converges to zero implies that lim t!! W (0; t) = 1 and also that, if k < N , there must exist at least one period i > k with (t) > ( t 
